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Preventing the Melting of the Arctic Council: 
China as a Permanent Observer and What It 
Means for the Council and the Environment 
BRIANNA WODISKE 
 
What will an ice-free Arctic look like, and when it happens, will 
environmental protection trump economic interests? With the Arctic ice 
melting at record pace, the world’s superpowers are increasingly 
jockeying for political influence and an economic position in the 
Arctic.
1
 In 2012, the ice in the Arctic melted at a record rate, and some 
scientists think that the summer ice could disappear within four years.
2
  
The fact that nations have interests and high hopes in the Arctic is 
“partly the result of the work of the US Geological Survey which 
estimated that the Arctic could contain up to 30 percent of the 
undiscovered gas reserves of the world and 13 percent of undiscovered 
oil in the world.”
3
 One author opines that seeking Arctic carbon fuels is 
“paradoxical” because these fuels have been, and still are melting the 
northern ice.
4
 
Further, “[o]f all Asian countries eyeing the Arctic, it is inevitably 
China that provokes the most interest and, in some quarters, alarm,”
5
 
due to the size of the country, its population, and its clear need to secure 
 
 1. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Race Is On as Ice Melts Reveal Arctic Treasures, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/science/earth/arctic-resources-exposed-by-
warming-set-off-competition.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.   
 2. Brad Plumer, When will the Arctic be ice-free in the summer? Maybe four years. Or 40, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-
klein/wp/2012/09/20/when-will-the-arctic-be-ice-free-maybe-four-years-or-40.  
 3. Rob Huebert, Cooperation or Conflict in the Arctic?, in CHANGES IN THE ARCTIC 
ENVIRONMENT AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 27, 29 (Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore & 
Thomas H. Heidar eds., 2010). 
 4. James Graff, Arctic: The Fight for the Top of the World, TIME, Oct. 1, 2007, at 28, 34, 
available at http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1663848-2,00.html. 
 5. Banyan, Snow dragons, ECONOMIST, Sept. 1, 2012, at 46, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21561891. 
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energy supplies and other resources.
6
 On May 15, 2013, China sought 
and was granted permanent observer status to the Arctic Council, the 
“main intergovernmental forum for the five countries on the Arctic 
Ocean—America, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia—and three 
others in the Arctic Circle (Finland, Iceland and Sweden).”
7
 
This note will argue that China’s acceptance to the Council will 
promote protection of the environment and provide a voice for other 
non-Arctic states. Section I will lay out the law governing the Arctic 
and China’s interest in the region. Section II will analyze the ways the 
Arctic Council has looked at applications in the past. Section III will 
look at China’s legal rights under the United Nations Convention of the 
Law of Seas (UNCLOS). Section IV will make the argument for the 
acceptance of China’s application for permanent observer status and 
explain why it is important; and finally, section V will conclude by 
looking at the implications of China’s acceptance and what role it will 
play in the Arctic Council’s future decisions.   
I. THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION AND CHINA’S RACE FOR A SEAT AT 
THE ARCTIC TABLE 
The United Nations Convention of the Law of Seas (UNCLOS) is 
referred to as a “constitution for the oceans.”
8
 UNCLOS established that 
“[e]very State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea 
up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles . . . .”
9
 The convention also 
gives each coastal State the sovereign rights to natural resources and 
certain economic activities in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
10
 
The EEZ is the area of sea extending as far as 200 nautical miles from 
the State’s coast.
11
 If a State wishes to establish outer limits of its 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its coast, it must make 
a submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(CLCS), whereby the limits shall not exceed 350 nautical miles off the 
State’s coast or shall not exceed 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 
 
 6. Id.  
 7. Id.   
 8. Michael W. Reed, An Attempt to Unravel Charting and Publicity Requirements Imposed 
by UNCLOS Article 16, in SELECTED CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 3, 3 
(Clive R. Symmons ed., 2010). 
 9. United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea art. 3, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 10. Id. art. 56. 
 11. Id. art. 57. 
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metre isobath, a line connecting the depth of 2,500 metres.
12
 The 
CLCS’s twenty-one members, all of whom are experts in geology, 
geophysics, and hydrography,
13
 make the final and binding 
recommendations to the coastal state relating to the outer limits of its 
continental shelf.
14
 
“The first comprehensive effort to implement an Arctic-wide 
regime dealing with the protection of the Arctic environment began 
with the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS).”
15
 
With the eight Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, Sweden, Russia, and the United States) serving as parties, the 
AEPS sought to identify Arctic environmental issues to develop plans 
for managing and protecting the region.
16
 The Arctic States later formed 
the Arctic Council,
17
 established by the Ottawa Declaration in 1996.
18
 
The Council was established so that the Arctic States and the indigenous 
communities could cooperate and coordinate the oversight of 
environmental protection programs established under the AEPS.
19
 The 
Council would also oversee and coordinate sustainable development 
programs and encourage education about the Arctic.
20
 One big 
limitation on the Arctic Council, however, is that the agreement is not 
established as hard law through a treaty, which means that it is not 
legally binding.
21
  
Aside from the eight member states on the Arctic Council, there 
are also permanent participants and observers. Observer status is open 
to non-Arctic states, inter-governmental organizations, inter-
parliamentary organizations, as well as non-governmental 
organizations.
22
 There are permanent observers and ad-hoc observers, 
the difference between the two is that only permanent observers are 
 
 12. See id. art. 76. 
 13. Id. Annex II, art. 2(1). 
 14. Id. art. 76(8). 
 15. Donald R. Rothwell, The Arctic in International Affairs: Time for a New Regime?, 15 
BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 241, 247 (2008). 
 16. Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, June 14, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1627, 1631-32 
[hereinafter AEPS]. 
 17. Rothwell, supra note 15, at 241, 247. 
 18. See generally Ottawa Declaration, Sept. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1387, available at 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/5-declarations 
[hereinafter Ottawa Declaration]. 
 19. Id. art. 1(a), (b).  
 20. Id. art. 1(c), (d). 
 21. See generally U.N. Charter. 
 22. Ottawa Declaration, supra note 18, art. 3. 
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automatically invited to the Council’s meetings.
23
 Permanent observers 
have the right to observe the Council’s actions, attend meetings, and 
contribute primarily through working groups.
24
 The Ottawa Declaration 
establishes the criteria for status as a permanent participant as well as 
the decision-making procedure for determining that status;
25
 the 
declaration states that “[d]ecisions of the Arctic Council are to be by 
consensus of the Members”
26
 and defines “Member” to include only the 
eight Arctic states.
27
 This decision, made by consensus, can only be 
undertaken after a “full consultation” with the permanent participants 
such as the organizations of the Arctic indigenous peoples.
28
  
The Ottawa Declaration however, lacks formalistic rules and 
guidelines in granting observers status. Although permanent observers 
do not have formal decision-making powers, they have more influence 
with the Council,
29
 so observers are in a better position to be heard with 
regard to the Council’s decisions. Having permanent observer status is 
crucial for China to take part in the Arctic strategy and to preserve a 
voice in matters dealing with how the Arctic will be protected or 
exploited.  
A. Why China Set Their Sights on the Arctic North 
If China fails to implement a viable Arctic strategy, the country 
could really be left out in the cold. One of China’s main interests in the 
Arctic is the opening of the Northern Sea Route
30
 because it would 
provide China with more direct trade routes.
31
 International shipping is 
important for China’s economic development because 46% of its gross 
domestic product (GDP) is shipping-dependent, which directly affects 
 
 23. Chris Irvine, China granted permanent observer status at Arctic Council, TELEGRAPH 
(May 15, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10060624/China-
granted-permanent-observer-status-at-Arctic-Council.html. 
 24. ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC COUNCIL OBSERVER MANUAL FOR SUBSIDIARY BODIES 4, 5, 
available at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/425-main-
documents-from-kiruna-ministerial-meeting [hereinafter OBSERVER MANUAL]. 
 25. Ottawa Declaration, supra note 18, art. 2. 
 26. Id. art. 7. 
 27. Id. art. 2. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See OBSERVER MANUAL, supra note 24, at 3. 
 30. See Margaret Blunden, Geopolitics and the Northern Sea Route, 88 THE ROYAL INST. 
OF INT’L AFF. 115, 125 (2012). 
 31. Id. 
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China’s economy as a whole.
32
 Most recently, a Chinese icebreaker ship 
became the first vessel to cross the Arctic Ocean, concluding a three-
month mission from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic via the Arctic.
33
 
By completing this mission, China sent a clear message about its 
interests in the region.   
Aside from China’s ability to trade more effectively, the Northern 
Sea route has other geopolitical implications. For one, the desire for 
peaceful shipping and the use of the Northern Sea route for commerce 
purposes is directly linked to the strength of a country’s navy.
34
 Thus, 
the Northern Sea Route has great economic and geopolitical 
implications for China.  
There are vast amounts of untapped oil and gas as well as natural 
resources in the Arctic.
35
 A total of seventeen surveyed sites found that 
there could be up to 90 billion barrels of undiscovered oil in the Arctic, 
which would amount to 13% of the world’s undiscovered reserves.
36
 
Moreover, as to natural gas, it is estimated that there is around 47.3 
trillion cubic meters of gas and 44 billion barrels of liquefied petroleum 
gas in the Arctic.
37
 Since China is growing and developing at a rapid 
pace, these resources would greatly benefit the country. Also, with 
China as “the world’s largest importer of iron ore and copper, and [the] 
second largest importer of hydrocarbons, it would be surprising if China 
did not have an interest in the Arctic’s mineral and hydrocarbon 
resources . . . .”
38
  
Moreover, research on climate change is important to China.
39
 
 
 32. Joseph K. Spears, China and the Arctic: The Awakening Snow Dragon, CHINA BRIEF 
Mar. 18, 2009, available at http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/cb_009_6_01.pdf. 
 33. China’s Snow Dragon icebreaker makes 85-day voyage to become to country’s first 
vessel to cross Arctic Ocean, NAT’L POST (Sept. 28, 2012), 
http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/09/28/chinas-snow-dragon-icebreaker-makes-85-day-voyage-
to-become-countrys-first-vessel-to-cross-arctic-ocean/ [hereinafter First Vessel to Cross]. 
      34.   A.T. MAHAN, THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783, 26-29 
(Project Gutenberg eBook elec. book ed. 2004), available at 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13529/13529-h/13529-h.htm#Page_26.  
 35. Christoph Siedler, Taking Stock of North Pole Riches, SPEIGEL ONLINE (Sept. 7, 2009), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-arctic-monopoly-taking-stock-of-north-pole-riches-
a-648197-druck.html. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Aldo Chircop, The Emergence of China as a Polar-Capable State, 7.1 CAN. NAVAL 
REV. 9, 12 (2011). 
 39. See NAT’L CAPITAL BRANCH OF THE CAN. INT’L COUNCIL & MUNK-GORDON ARCTIC 
SEC. PROGRAM, Interests and Roles of Non-Arctic States in the Arctic, Background Brief 4 (Oct. 
2011), available at http://www.opencanada.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11/arctic_seminar_background_brief.pdf [hereinafter CAPITAL BRANCH]. 
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China has invested heavily in its marine research capabilities and has 
even established research stations in the Arctic, largely due to rights 
granted to certain nationals of other countries under the Svalbard 
Treaty.
40
 Annually, China spends around £38.5 million (€49 million) on 
polar research, which is approximately the same amount of money that 
South Korea spends and considerably more than how much the United 
States spends.
41
 China’s investment in Arctic research sends a clear 
message to the world that it wants to help and also that it has the means 
to do so.  
Among other things, the icebreaker that made its expedition across 
the Arctic Ocean earlier this year has: 
[A] data processing center and seven laboratories with over 500sq 
meters of working space, […] operational equipment, a freezer to 
store samples, a low temperature cultivation room, a clean 
laboratory, a marine biological laboratory, a marine chemical 
laboratory, a geological laboratory, and a CTD winch, a biological 
winch, a geological laboratory, and a hallow-section device of EK-
500 model.
42
 
With such strong interests and dedication to the region, China has 
certainly made its case for its inclusion in the Arctic governance.  
II. THE COLD SHOULDER OR A WARM SEAT AT THE TABLE? THE WAY 
THE ARCTIC COUNCIL DETERMINED PERMANENT STATUS IN THE PAST  
Currently, there is a lack of information on the Arctic Council’s 
process in determining whether or not it will grant observer status to 
various states throughout the years. However, the postponement of the 
European Union’s status as an observer may provide some insight into 
the Council’s thoughts.
43
 First, and perhaps most importantly, allowing 
the European Union observer status would open up the option to a 
whole range of other state and non-state actors to apply.
44
 Given the 
 
 40. Chircop, supra note 38, at 12. 
 41. MALTE HUMPERT & ANDREAS RASPOTNIK, FROM ‘GREAT WALL’ TO ‘GREAT WHITE 
NORTH’: EXPLAINING CHINA’S POLITICS IN THE ARCTIC 3 (2012), available at 
http://europeangeostrategy.ideasoneurope.eu/files/2013/04/Long-Post-2.pdf [hereinafter 
HUMPERT & RASPOTNIK]. 
 42. Magdalena Tomasik, The 5th Chinese National Arctic Research Expedition, ARCTIC 
PORTAL, http://arcticportal.org/features/805-chinare5 (last visited Jan. 2, 2013). 
 43. EU application to Arctic Council postponed, NORTH NORWAY (May 18, 2011), 
http://www.northnorway.org/nyheter/847-eu-application-to-arctic-council-postponed [hereinafter 
Application postponed]. 
 44. Arctic Council, Kiruna Declaration, MM08 (May 15, 2013). 
WODISKE_FINAL_FOR_PUB 10/14/2014  2:22 PM 
2014] Preventing the Melting of the Artic Council 311 
 
structure of the current Arctic Council, an influx of applicants may not 
have been something it was ready or even willing to address. This is 
doubtful though in light of the most recent acceptance of India, Italy, 
Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and, of course, China as observers.
45
  
The European Union decision was, at least partially, due to a 
dispute between Canada and the European Union over a seal hunting 
ban and the effects it would have on indigenous groups.
46
  Eva Aariak, 
the premier of Nunavut, Canada’s majority Inuit territory, expressed 
concerns that the European nations are working hard to counteract her 
indigenous group’s way of life.
47
  Moreover, “[t]he Arctic Council . . . 
was formed to promote co-operation and co-ordination and interaction 
in regards to member states in the Arctic. What [the] European Union is 
trying to do is not those.”
48
 Overall, it seems like the Arctic Council’s 
decision to deny the European Union’s application was grounded in 
politics rather than in any set procedure to examine the admittance of 
new observers. The Arctic Council’s decision thus leaves room for a 
more defined structure.   
Alternatively, perhaps the deciding factors in the Council’s 
decision to admit France, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, 
and the UK as observers could provide the answer. The answer, 
however, is less technical than one might hope. Like with the European 
Union, the Arctic Council has great discretion and liberty to pick and 
choose which countries or groups it wants to have more influence in the 
Arctic.
49
 Therefore, in the event a country plans to seek or is seeking to 
join the tight-knit Arctic family, it should avoid inflaming member 
states.  
 
 45. Steven Lee Myers, Arctic Council Adds 6 Nations as Observer States, Including China, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/world/europe/arctic-council-
adds-six-members-including-china.html?_r=1&. 
 46. Clive Schofield & Tavis Potts, Across the Top of the World? Emerging Arctic 
Navigational Opportunities and Arctic Governance 2009 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 472, 481; 
Michael Byers, Circumpolar Challenges: An Ambitious Agenda for the Arctic Council, RIDEAU 
INST. 21 (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.rideauinstitute.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Byers-
Arctic-Council-pre-conf-report-web.pdf [hereinafter Circumpolar Challenges]; see also Kiruna 
Declaration, supra note 44, at 48. 
 47. Nunavut premier wants EU barred from Arctic Council, CBC NEWS (Apr. 15, 2009), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2009/04/15/arctic-council.html. 
 48. Id. 
 49. HUMPERT & RASPOTNIK, supra note 41, at 8. 
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A. Recent Developments to Admitting Permanent Observers: New 
Criteria Equals a Better Understanding 
Despite a less than clear history of admitting observers, there are 
some recent developments. At the Nuuk Ministerial Meeting in 2011, 
the Council adopted the recommendations of the Senior Arctic Officials 
(SAOs) on the role and criteria for observers to the Arctic Council.
50
 
The adopted recommendations state that the Council will take into 
account the extent to which observers:  
 Accept and support the objectives of the Arctic Council 
defined in the Ottawa declaration.  
 Recognize Arctic States’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction in the Arctic.  
 Recognize that an extensive legal framework applies to the 
Arctic Ocean including, notably, the Law of the Sea, and 
that this framework provides a solid foundation for 
responsible management of this ocean.  
 Respect the values, interests, culture and traditions of Arctic 
indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants.  
 Have demonstrated a political willingness as well as 
financial ability to contribute to the work of the Permanent 
Participants and other Arctic indigenous peoples.  
 Have demonstrated their Arctic interests and expertise 
relevant to the work of the Arctic Council.  
 Have demonstrated a concrete interest and ability to support 
the work of the Arctic Council, including partnerships with 
member states and Permanent Participants bringing Arctic 
concerns to global decision making bodies.
51
  
This new checklist to admitting observers may prove to be a 
helpful tool for the Council in justifying either the admittance or the 
exclusion of new members. Nevertheless, it will be a helpful tool that 
the rest of the world can finally use as reference when looking at how 
the Council makes decisions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 50. Klaus Dodds, Anticipating the Arctic and the Arctic Council: Pre-emption, Precaution 
and Preparedness, THE ARCTIC COUNCIL: ITS PLACE IN THE FUTURE OF ARCTIC GOVERNANCE 
1, 248 (Thomas S. Axworthy, Timo Koivurova & Waliul Hasanat eds., 2012). 
 51. Id. at 170. 
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III. CHINA, THE ARCTIC, AND THE LEGAL UPHILL BATTLE: EXAMINING 
CHINA’S INTERESTS IN LIGHT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA  
China argued in the past that since the effects of climate change 
will have an impact at the regional and interregional level, the external 
actors from the Arctic should be allowed to actively engage in Arctic 
discussions.
52
  To date, China adopted a wait-and-see approach to Arctic 
developments, wary that active overtures may cause alarm in other 
countries due to China’s size and status as a rising global power.
53
 
Chinese officials stressed that China’s Arctic research activities remain 
focused on the climatic and environmental consequences of the ice 
melting in the Arctic.
54
  This stance by Chinese officials was likely an 
attempt to quell any fears held by the Arctic states.  
China is aware that although permanent observers do not have 
voting rights, they do have an automatic invitation to Arctic Council 
meetings and activities.
55
 With this understanding, China hopes to be 
increasingly influential over the Council’s decisions.
56
 The Arctic 
Council’s power granted under UNCLOS (that actively governs the 
Arctic) is problematic for China. As discussed above, under UNCLOS, 
the Arctic Council was delegated the authority to oversee the Arctic 
region, the non-Arctic states have little to no role in the council’s 
decision-making process.
57
 Therefore, while China will have a difficult 
time establishing any “legal rights” to the Arctic per se, the country can 
still help create a stronger regime that is more inclusive and conducive 
to the times and bring many invaluable tools to the Arctic regime.   
There is another less legal obstacle worth noting, as identified by 
one author. The current international mechanisms are based on 
“Western” values of freedom, equality, and democracy, creating 
obvious discrepancies between the basic social system and ideology of 
China.
58
 “As a result, China’s participation in international mechanisms 
is restrained.”
59
 China should therefore be more open to Western views 
 
 52. See HUMPERT & RASPOTNIK, supra note 41, at 8. 
 53. Linda Jakobson, China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic, STOKHOLM INT’L PEACE 
RESEARCH INST. 2 (Mar. 2010), http://books.sipri.org/files/insight/SIPRIInsight1002.pdf. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Linda Jakobson & Jingchao Peng, China’s Arctic Aspirations, STOCKHOLM INT’L 
PEACE RESEARCH INST., at V (Nov. 2012). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 11-17. 
 58. David Curtis Wright, The Dragon Eyes the Top of the World, 8 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 
19 (2011). 
 59. Id. 
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and values as well as be more involved to advance their international 
presence.
60
 In sum, while China faces some hurdles in finding a voice in 
the Arctic north, it seeks ways to justify its position and propose 
alternatives that could bring more power to the Council.  
A. China’s Traditional View of their Place in the Arctic: The 
Convention on the High Seas and Why it Matters 
China traditionally justified its position in the Arctic by using the 
Convention on the High Seas (“the Convention”). The Convention 
establishes that the land beyond internal waters and the territorial sea 
are free for all mankind.
61
  The law states that everything beyond the 
EEZ and all continental shelves are part of the high seas; accordingly, 
no one owns these seabeds.
62
 China, however, fears that the high seas’ 
water will shrink if all of the claims by Arctic states to the outer-
continental shelf are deemed legal.
63
 It is estimated that about 88 percent 
of the Arctic’s seabed would be controlled by the Arctic states if all of 
the current and expected continental shelf claims were approved.
64
  
Despite the possible setbacks for China if the continental shelf 
claims are approved, Arctic states must realize that limiting non-Arctic 
state participation may cause effects on the Arctic states in the future if 
non-Arctic state cooperation is necessary.
65
  More importantly, 
UNCLOS does not seem to address the issue of outsiders’ abilities to 
use and exploit unclaimed portions of the Arctic because of the 
loophole—the Convention.
66
  Therefore, China’s traditional view of its 
place in the Arctic should not go unnoticed because other states might 
utilize a similar view to assert a presence in the Arctic.  
Additionally, it is particularly important for Arctic states and the 
region’s aboriginal peoples to secure support from the rest of the 
international community.
67
  It is important for the Council to recognize 
that “some of the Arctic issues are trans-regional, such as climate 
 
 60. Id. at 21. 
 61. Convention on the High Seas art. 4, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200 
(entered into force Sept. 30, 1962) [hereinafter Convention on the High Seas].  
 62. Yekini Abubakri Olakulehin, The Scramble for Arctic and International Law, SOCIAL 
SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK 6 (2007). 
 63. Jakobson & Peng, supra note 55. 
 64. Wright, supra note 58, at 34.  
 65. Aldo Chircop, Should Observer Participation In Arctic Ocean Governance Be 
Enhanced, 7 CAN. NAVAL REV. 3 (2012). 
 66. See generally Convention on the High Seas, supra note 61. 
 67. Jakobson & Peng, supra note 55.  
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change and international shipping, which involve the interests of non-
Arctic states.”
68
 It seems unfair and unwise to bar interested parties who 
clearly have a stake in the Arctic as well as in the effects the Arctic will 
have on the global community from its governance. In the end, the 
Convention may offer another way for non-Arctic states to get involved 
and the Council should be careful that the loophole not cost them their 
relevancy.   
Despite claims that China has taken more of a “wait-and-see 
approach” to the Arctic, China has already begun developing an Arctic 
strategy.
69
 Prior to the May 2013 acceptance, China invested in Arctic 
research and tried to establish regional, political, and economic 
partnerships to show their commitment to the region.
70
 One example of 
China’s efforts was marked by a Chinese head of state’s first visit to 
Denmark.
71
 The Chinese prime minister also made trips to Iceland and 
Sweden for the first time in decades.
72
  
China also sought to establish “lucrative” trade deals with some of 
the Arctic states
73
 to secure resources from the countries that border the 
Arctic with the ability to exploit within their EEZ.
74
 Essentially, China 
found other ways to secure their place in the Arctic in preparation for 
the possibility that the Council would continue to ignore their pleas for 
inclusion. The combination of the Convention and China’s ambitious 
Arctic endeavors makes China an undeniable force to be reckoned with.  
The Council could have used UNCLOS to their advantage if it 
wanted to reject China’s application since the UNCLOS is “vague and 
general.”
75
 This would provide the Council flexibility in articulating a 
reason for China’s exclusion. In the end, however, it seems that the 
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Council could not ignore China’s efforts any longer.  
B.  Treading Carefully: Arctic States Acting Any Differently Than China 
in the South China Sea? 
China had to be careful because a more assertive approach 
regarding other countries’ sovereignty claims in the Arctic could have 
undermined China’s position on its own rights and sovereignty in 
contested maritime spaces like the South China Sea.
76
 China applies 
very different approaches to defining a region as a territory in the South 
China Sea as it does in the Arctic Ocean.
77
 Were the Arctic states really 
acting any differently than China with regard to their claims in the 
South China Sea? 
China asserts claims over some small islands in the South China 
Sea as well as claims to the surrounding EEZs of those islands.
78
 A few 
islands qualify as falling within China’s 12-nautical mile territorial sea, 
but a very small amount would qualify under UNCLOS as falling within 
the EEZ or continental shelf.
79
 Despite these facts, China has now 
claimed the entire South China Sea based on self-created rules.
80
 
Nevertheless, China would likely have been upset if any of the Arctic 
five did something similar.
81
  
Because of the issues surrounding China’s claims in the South 
China Sea, some Chinese officials, when discussing territorial 
developments in the Arctic region, emphasized China’s respect for the 
sovereign territorial rights of Arctic countries and reassured that China’s 
interests in the region are benign and cooperative in nature.
82
 This was 
an attempt to divert the attention away from their claims in the South 
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China Sea and to encourage Arctic states of their good intentions. China 
had to avoid showing disfavor or indifference for the Arctic States’ 
claims to territory in the Arctic to secure their future there. Thus, China 
had to find the perfect balance between showing interest and 
commitment to the region and avoiding stepping on the toes of any 
Arctic state in order to avoid drawing attention to their claims in the 
South China Sea.   
IV. AN ARGUMENT FOR CHINA’S ACCEPTANCE AS A PERMANENT 
OBSERVER: BENEFITING FROM THEIR FINANCIAL WEALTH AND 
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
The Arctic Council and the future Canadian chairman faced a 
tough decision in 2013 when deciding whether to accept China as a 
permanent observer. Many factors played into the decision, factors 
which will change the Council’s make-up forever. There are some 
undeniable truths and realities that Arctic states had to face, but China 
will likely prove to have a positive impact on the Council’s make-up 
and future governance.  
A.  The Next Arctic Council Chairman: The Canadian Perspective and 
What Their Role Was in Deciding China’s Application 
Since May 2013, Canada has been the new chairman of the Arctic 
Council, and it was a good time for Canada to voice its desire to foster 
cooperation in the region.
83
 “[W]orking on building common ground 
with China and taking its concerns and interests into account could 
prove profitable inasmuch as China could, in turn, consider Canada’s 
specific interests in the Arctic.”
84
 Canadian interests overlap with 
China’s in “areas of research, environmental regulation of maritime 
shipping, interpretation of maritime treaties, and the need to cooperate 
and engage in multilateral mechanisms to reach an international 
compromise on these issues.”
85
  
Moreover, Canada and the United States are currently entangled in 
a dispute over the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary, an area of 
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approximately six thousand square nautical miles of sea area above rich 
oil and natural-gas resources.
86
 With China on Canada’s side, Canada 
could counter the United States’ refusal to recognize the Canadian claim 
over the Northwest Passage.
87
 This could facilitate a dialogue between 
nations about shipping rules and guidelines for the Arctic.
88
  Thus, 
China could really prove to be more of a resource than a threat to 
Canada.
89
  
B.  A Chilling Truth: What China Brings to the Table and Why the 
Arctic Council Needs Them 
One important contribution China offers is scientific research 
capabilities. This is important because “cooperation amongst scientists 
is one of the best ways to reduce the high costs of arctic research.”
90
 
China brings the following to the table: a research station – Huang He 
Zhan – in Svalbard, Norway, which is well inside the Arctic Ocean in 
the Barents Sea; three Arctic research expeditions planned over the next 
three to four years; and intentions to build a new 8000 ton ice breaker 
by 2013 in addition to its current vessel, the Xuelong-Snow Dragon, to 
cruise the Arctic region to conduct various expeditions.
91
 It is 
abundantly clear that China is willing to spend the money and invest in 
researching the Arctic region.  
A Danish diplomat and economist who did a recent study on the 
rise of Asia said that even though Asia is “still in the catch-up phase 
with regard to technology, innovation, invention and science,” it still 
has a lot that can help foster growth.
92
 He also noted that Asia is in a 
unique position because it is not worried about where to get money, but 
rather how to spend the money available; “[n]ot only will Asia be the 
world’s creditor, but Asia will take over a large part of global economic 
activity. . . . Most of the new multinationals entering the list of the 
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world’s largest and most important enterprises will grow out of Asia.”
93
  
This study proves that China will have the capital to invest in vital 
and important projects in the Arctic.  As the ice melts more rapidly each 
year, the need for investing in Arctic research becomes even more 
pressing. The world has yet to see the effects of climate change and the 
Council would be wise to view China as an ally in fighting to protect 
the people across the globe as well as finding sustainable solutions to 
Arctic exploration and development.   
China should not worry too much about contesting claims by 
Arctic countries to extend their EEZs because offshore oil and gas is 
expensive to find, extract, and transport, especially in an extremely 
remote and often inhospitable region.
94
 Moreover, to be able to access 
the Arctic’s resources, the Arctic countries will need the strong Chinese 
markets as well as their massive amounts of capital.
95
 The Arctic states 
were wise to warm to the undeniable truth that China has the wealth and 
tools necessary to make the Council succeed.  
Currently, all of the Council’s funding comes from voluntary 
contributions by individual Arctic states.
96
 Under current practice, states 
propose projects or identify working groups they wish to support, and 
these governments then implement and fund them.”
97
 There are 
problems with this voluntary method. Not all states give money to all 
projects, and some states give more than others.
98
 Therefore, under this 
type of funding system, the more funding the merrier. China would be 
able to pick projects it wants to pursue and could fund part, if not all, of 
the research. This is extremely beneficial for such a haphazardly funded 
organization. 
China is also extremely concerned with understanding the current 
and the future effects of the changing environment on the country’s 
continent as well as on its domestic agriculture and economic 
development.
99
 The research station in Svaldbard has been in operation 
since 2004, and since 2009, Norway and China have had formal 
dialogues regarding Arctic issues, identifying climate and 
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environmental issues as areas of mutual interest.
100
 By engaging China, 
who is largely responsible for global emissions, the Council can make 
the country more conscious of Arctic issues and help promote 
negotiation and implementation of agreements to protect the Arctic 
environment.
101
  
With nearly 20 percent of the world’s population,
102
 falling slightly 
below 1.5 billion,
103
 the effects of the melting ice will play a crucial role 
in protecting the Chinese people and their livelihood. The Council 
hopes that the more China researches and the more time China spends 
in the Arctic, it will have fewer motives for a potential resource grab.  
Ultimately, the benefits outweigh the potential costs of allowing China a 
seat at the Arctic table.   
Furthermore, the main criterion stipulated in the rules regarding 
admitting observers is that the non-Arctic states or other organizations 
must be able to contribute to the Council’s work.
104
 After looking at 
China’s efforts and expenditures in the Arctic, it is clear that it can 
contribute to the Council’s work.  If, however, the Council finds any 
activities at odds with the Council’s Declaration, it can suspend 
admission.
105
   
China has a lot of scientific capital; for instance, incorporating 
their scientists into the Council’s Working Groups (“WGs”) and Task 
Forces (“TFs”) will be an invaluable tool in advancing polar research.
106
 
“The chief idea behind this arrangement is that the WGs should operate 
as international research institutions, taking into account the quality of 
the projects and researchers’ backgrounds rather than as an extension of 
political organs.”
107
 The addition of the Chinese scientists will 
strengthen the WGs and TFs and will likely produce new studies. This 
will ultimately help protect the region and its resources more 
effectively.   
As discussed earlier, because of how funding works, if China finds 
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a certain area of research it wants to pursue and decides to lead the 
project, it will likely fund most, if not all, of any given project.
108
 This 
would be extremely helpful in achieving the Council’s overall goals. 
Moreover, without any funding, the voluntary funding cannot “suffice 
in the future if the Council is to fully reflect an expanded mandate, carry 
out its evolving agenda, implement a developing, expansive 
communication and outreach program, and generally be more strategic 
in outlook and operation.”
109
 The Council has a lot on its plate in the 
coming years, and help from a wealthy nation like China will ultimately 
help it achieve its goals.  
C.  Side Effects: Other Benefits of Having China at the Arctic Table 
The acceptance of China to the Council will help relationships 
among Arctic states improve, and may also foster bilateral trade and 
investment relations.
110
 The economic possibilities could also trickle 
down to other states and indigenous groups in the region. Similarly, as a 
major trading nation, China can bring the cost of goods down with the 
possibility of opening a shorter shipping route across the top of the 
world.
111
 It is estimated that the opening of the Northern Sea Route, the 
route across the Arctic, could save China between $60 billion to $120 
billion dollars annually.
112
 Of course, this could bring the cost of 
Chinese goods down for states that purchase from them. Additionally, 
in choosing to admit China and potentially opening the door for more 
permanent observers, the Council is broadening awareness about Arctic 
issues and their goals.
113
 It is likely that there are other factors that play 
into the Council’s decision. 
China is also the world’s largest fishing nation, and although 
Arctic states can regulate fishing within 200 nautical miles of their 
shores, they cannot do so on the High Seas.
114
 The regulation for areas 
beyond the 200 nautical miles is only facilitated through regional 
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fishery organizations.
115
 The United States would like to create a 
regional fishery organization for the Arctic Ocean before commercial 
fishing begins there, and China might prove helpful in efforts to do 
so.
116
 China already works well with several regional fisheries 
organizations and in return, China is provided fixed quotas of fish 
stock.
117
 Therefore, China provides valuable contacts, relationships and 
knowledge about creating a strong organization.  
Fortunately, the aforementioned benefits of including China in the 
Arctic Council as a permanent observer were not overlooked or 
underestimated because the Council admitted China as an observer on 
May 15, 2013.
118
 This is a step in the right direction because countries 
such as China are the ones that the Council needs on their side, working 
vigorously and tirelessly to meet the challenges of today. Postponing 
China’s application would have only delayed the inevitable fact that the 
Council needs to admit new members in order to strengthen their power 
and international authority. China is, therefore, a gateway into a new 
way of Arctic governance.  
V. HOW WILL THE ARCTIC COUNCIL ADDRESS FUTURE ARCTIC 
APPLICATIONS?: THE IMPLICATIONS OF ALLOWING CHINA A SEAT AT THE 
TABLE 
With China as a new permanent observer, how should the Arctic 
Council address future applications and pleas for admission? The 
Council should be more open-minded to a new configuration of the 
Council and should use China’s acceptance as a way to build a stronger 
Arctic Council. Oran Young puts it best, “what is needed to maintain 
the Arctic as a zone of peace is a more effective governance system for 
the region.”
119
 China provides the perfect opportunity for this shift.   
Also, the Council frustrates their own purpose by refusing to let 
non-Arctic states be a party to Arctic discussions and governance. To 
advance its mission, the Council needs to garner support and gain 
international recognition and authority, not upset non-Arctic actors. The 
most effective way to achieve that is to find a place for various 
interested parties and work together to find solutions to Arctic concerns. 
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Therefore, if the Council had decided to refuse China’s application, it 
would not only have lost its wealth and research capabilities, but may 
also have suffered from severe political ramifications.
120
  
History suggests that China does not take rejection very well or 
lightly, so it is unknown how this decision would have played into their 
thought process and subsequent relations elsewhere around the world.
121
 
Norwegian Arctic policy expert Lunde said he was “a bit afraid, for 
instance, that if China is continuously denied access, it will be more 
difficult for the responsible people in leadership to discipline all the 
players that might become more irresponsible in their attitudes towards 
Arctic cooperation.”
122
 In essence, China’s application could have 
affected Arctic relations as well as other international efforts.  
China has contributed greatly by stepping up and getting involved 
in the Arctic.  “China has spoken for the global commons in ways that 
no other major state has done in recent times.”
123
 Essentially, China has 
become an advocate for the area within the High Seas as remaining part 
of common heritage of mankind and therefore, is acting as a guardian 
for the interests of developing countries who may not yet have the 
resources to contribute to the Arctic.
124
 Admitting China as a permanent 
observer will cause a ripple affect throughout developing countries and 
will likely give them similar access to the Arctic when they are prepared 
to become more involved.  
A. Avoiding an Arctic Council Meltdown: The Future and Strengthening 
of the Council 
If the Arctic Council can garner more international cooperation, as 
it did through admitting China, then it will open the door to sharing 
research and knowledge among many different groups and state 
actors.
125
 This could prove to be beneficial in finding a more sustainable 
solution to Arctic governance, since more people would be working 
towards the solution.  Moreover, China’s presence and participation as 
an observer will strengthen the “legitimacy, authority and effectiveness 
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of the Arctic Council.”
126
 
There has also been much discussion about whether the Arctic 
Council is and will be effective, regardless of attempts to strengthen the 
regime. Some argue for an Arctic Treaty similar to the Antarctic Treaty 
because it would create a “hard law” regime.
127
 The Antarctic Treaty is 
legally binding and has protected the Antarctic since the mid-twentieth 
century.
128
 The main goal was to promote research and avoid a land grab 
by states.
129
 This type of treaty, if implemented in the Arctic, might 
force the “coastal States to stop and think about whether they really 
want to despoil one of the last pristine places on the planet.”
130
  
However, others argue that an Arctic Treaty is not the most 
effective way to address Arctic issues.
131
 First, the Arctic is very 
different from the Antarctic because Antarctica is surrounded by land, 
as opposed to the Arctic, which is surrounded by water.
132
 Also, people 
live on the Arctic.
133
 Furthermore, the US and Russia would never 
agree.  Accordingly, strengthening the current regime would be much 
more effective.
134
 Thus, for the time being, it may be best to work with 
what we have rather than undertake a completely new endeavor 
considering the difference in the regions.  
“Geographically, the sheer distance of the Antarctic from other 
countries diffuses the interests of any one nation, while the Arctic 
Ocean directly abuts the territory of individual nations and the Arctic 
region includes territories of several sovereign nations.”
135
 Also, the 
Arctic is different from the Antarctic because it not only deals with state 
actors, but indigenous groups and other non-states actors.
136
 So, the 
Arctic faces different challenges than that of Antarctica, not only 
because surrounding states have more of a national interest in protecting 
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their piece of the Arctic pie, but because of the important role that non-
states actors play.
137
 These are realities that must be acknowledged and 
addressed accordingly.  
Authors Liu and Yang gave four reasons for expressing similar 
pessimism as described above: first, Antarctica is a continent and the 
only piece of land in the world without a sovereign whereas in the 
Arctic, there are several states with territorial sovereignty, exclusive 
economic zones, and continental shelves; second, article 234 of 
UNCLOS already addresses ice-covered sea areas, and UNCLOS is 
widely applied in the Arctic region; third, many bilateral and 
multilateral agreements pertaining to the Arctic have already been 
concluded under the influence of UNCLOS, including AEPS; and 
fourth, the Antarctic is a non-militarized region whereas nuclear 
weapons are present in the Arctic, the most militarized region in the 
world.
138
 
However, to strengthen the Arctic Council, the Arctic Eight must 
sacrifice some control over their natural resources
139
 because “in 
considering the long-term benefits from an intact Arctic environment, 
the costs of sacrificing certain economic resources are minor.”
140
 The 
Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council in 2011 was a step in 
the right direction because the Council proposed a number of concrete 
measures with regard to climate change and environmental protection; 
the Council also adopted guidelines regarding the role and criteria for 
admitting observers, as discussed previously.
141
 This demonstrates the 
Council’s commitment to using its power more effectively and also 
signals the Council’s willingness to modify existing guidelines and 
openness to change. 
One way the Council could strengthen their internal structure 
would be to move away from its current mandate of environmental 
protection and sustainable development to instead focus on a greater 
number of issues such as fisheries and marine mammals as well as 
political and security-related support.
142
 “This could allow a better 
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division of labour between the Working groups.”
143
 Again, this would 
all help increase the Council’s legitimacy and authority. Furthermore, 
there should be a person responsible for media relations to both increase 
the Council’s visibility and educate the public about Arctic issues.
144
 
Several reports have already recommended a number of procedural 
improvements that Canada should pursue during its time as Chairman.
145
 
Suggested improvements include: developing funding arrangements to 
promote the fuller participation of indigenous peoples; holding Arctic 
Council ministerial meetings every year instead of every other year; 
developing a common Canada-US agenda for the two countries’ 
successive chairmanships (2013-2017); and encouraging the Arctic 
Council to recognize the special roles played by regional, state, and 
territorial governments in Arctic governance.
146
  
The hurdle to achieving a restructured and strengthened Arctic 
Council will be the Arctic states themselves,
147
 since each state wants to 
pursue their own national interests above those of the global 
community.
148
 The acceptance of China and other states
149
 however, 
signals an effort by the Council to be more cooperative and inclusive, 
which in turn may have averted a catastrophic Arctic Council 
meltdown.   
B. Leading Up to China’s Acceptance 
Prior to the decision on May 15, 2013, the Canadian government 
noted that although the “current informal nature [of the Arctic Circle] . . 
. has served Canada well for many years . . . the growing demands on 
the organization may require changes to make it more robust.”
150
 The 
United States also has a similar view whereby it would allow for 
updating aspects of the Council.
151
 The Scandinavian countries are the 
most receptive to opening up the Council to new members and 
observers.
152
 The aforementioned evidence is important because it 
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signals that some Arctic members are open to change and provides a 
glimmer of optimism.  
Now you may be wondering what was the actual likelihood of the 
Arctic Council accepting China as a permanent observer. The director 
of the department for international and strategic studies at the China 
Institute of International Studies thought that China had a “50-50 
chance” of becoming a permanent observer.
153
 In reality, the decision 
would be determined by a multitude of factors starting in the capitals of 
other Arctic powers, “notably Norway, Sweden and Russia.”
154
  
Sweden wanted the China application decided by May 2013.
155
 
Norway clashed “with China over the awarding of the Nobel Peace 
Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiabo,” and Russia had not shown that it 
was warming to the idea of China joining the Council as a permanent 
observer.
156
  
It has been said, however, that China “wooed the Arctic Council” 
at the January 22, 2013 Conference of the Arctic in Tromsø, Norway.
157
 
On January 21, Zhao Jun, a Chinese ambassador to Norway, said in a 
keynote speech that, “China believes the Arctic Council is the most 
important international forum for discussions about environmental 
protection and sustainable development in the Arctic.”
158
 This likely 
reassured the Arctic Council who was visibly concerned about opening 
up the Council to more members. It was important that the Council see 
new members, like China, as assets rather than enemies.
159
 China 
provided the perfect opportunity to look towards a newer and more 
formidable Arctic Council that could more effectively govern the 
treasures of the Arctic. 
Though stated in the context of the Cold War, Gorbachev’s famous 
Murmansk Speech of 1987 still applies to the modern Arctic landscape: 
The Arctic is not only the Arctic Ocean, but also the northern 
tips of three continents: Europe, Asia and America. It is the 
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place where Euroasian, North American and Asian Pacific 
regions meet, where frontiers come close to one another and 
the interests of the states belonging to mutually opposed 
military blocs and nonaligned ones cross.
160
 
 
The community and interrelationship of the interests of our 
entire world is felt in the northern part of the globe.
161
 
So even at this point in history, Gorbachev was correct about how 
interconnected the Arctic is with many different continents and with 
many divergent views.   
C. The Current State of Affairs 
As mentioned previously, during the May 15, 2013 ministerial 
meeting in Kiruna, the eight Arctic Council members granted 
permanent observer status to China, India, Japan, South Korea, 
Singapore and Italy.
162
 However, the European Union will not become a 
permanent observer until it has resolved some final disagreements with 
Canada concerning the import of seal products.
163
 Despite the possibility 
that the European Union could decide to intentionally frustrate the 
Council’s goals because it is upset that it was not granted status, it will 
probably just continue to seek a resolution with regard to the seal 
product ban since it is so close to gaining the acceptance it so 
desperately seeks. Additionally, the Council agreed on a new manual 
that will govern the activities and roles of the observers.
164
 The 
European Union will not be able to directly raise issues but will have to 
bring them forward through one of the eight core members.
165
 This 
manual was important for the eight Arctic states in reasserting their role, 
and stood as a reminder to the new observers of their place at the Arctic 
table.  
Sweden’s foreign minister, Carl Bildt, affirmed the idea that the 
addition of the observers strengthened the Council, stating that, “[b]y 
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being observer[s], these organizations and states, they accept the 
principles and the sovereignty of the Arctic Council on Arctic issues.”
166
 
Additionally, Mr. Carl Bildt thinks that the expansion further 
strengthens the Council’s international clout and influence.
167
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There must exist a perfect balance in the Arctic between exploring 
new opportunities and addressing environmental concerns. This is 
especially true because: 
The Arctic is the world’s last continuous and unexploited 
region, being highly unique in terms of its landscape, having 
an increased proportion of continental shelves, a low level of 
sunlight, extremely low water temperatures, presence of 
permanent sea-ice cover, and its indigenous peoples and 
ecosystems, as well as its vulnerability to climate change.
168
 
China offers the Council a shared interest in learning about and 
finding ways to protect this precious environment. It also has the 
wealth, scientific tools, and capabilities to assist the Council in 
achieving these environmental goals. Those same tools and capabilities 
can also be used to discover ways or programs for sustainable 
development in the region. Moreover, it will be better for the Council to 
have big international players like China on their side in order to gain 
international influence and to avoid losing their influence altogether.  
Further, “[i]n an increasingly interdependent world, in both the 
economic and the ecological senses of the term, the idea of international 
cooperation is not just an ideal but an imperative.”
169
 The problems that 
face the Arctic are not for the Arctic states to handle alone. The effects 
and implications of a warming Arctic and the governance of the region 
will reach to all corners of the globe, and the Council should not miss 
the opportunity to get more hands and heads in the game.  
Overall, the decision to admit China was a complicated one with 
many political and economic effects. There are passionate advocates on 
both sides and the decision was ultimately decided by a privileged few. 
Aside from the Council now having China on their side, it will face 
many legal questions as it moves forward in trying to pursue building a 
stronger and more formidable system to govern the Arctic. The 
 
 166. Myers, supra note 45, at 1. 
 167. Id. at 2. 
 168. Georgescu, supra note 132, at 19. 
 169. SANJAY CHATURVEDI, THE POLAR REGIONS: A POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 37 (1996). 
WODISKE_FINAL_FOR_PUB 10/14/2014  2:22 PM 
330 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 36:305 
 
decisions made by the Arctic Council will have national and 
international effects because the unknown effects that this melting 
region will pose to states and to people.  Hopefully, China can start the 
discussion and encourage the debate about the future of the Arctic. 
China will inevitably play an important role in international affairs 
across the globe as its population grows in numbers, power, and wealth. 
The Council was wise in recognizing the ability to create a mutually 
beneficial relationship with this rising super power. 
 
